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Abstract
Motivated by the recent European migrant crisis, Brexit, and President Trump’s
immigration priorities, we provide new evidence into how migration fears and migration
policy uncertainty affect macroeconomic outcomes across France, Germany, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. We investigate the impact of immigration-related
fear and uncertainty on economic activity via vector autoregression models. Our find-
ings indicate that both indices are associated with decreases in industrial production
in all countries except Germany. Surprise increases in immigration-related fears have
negative influence on unemployment rates in these four countries too. We also show
that innovations in the migration related uncertainty indices do not foreshadow signif-
icant declines in output.
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1 Introduction
The topic of international migration and its consequences has come into vogue in policy
circles recently, particularly in Europe and the United States (US). Between 2015 and 2016,
the European Union (EU) experienced a massive influx of refugees, commonly known as the
“European refugee crisis”. This marked the biggest wave of migrants entering Europe since
World War II, and more than 1.3 million refugees crossed the Mediterranean and Aegean
Seas trying to reach Europe (Trines, 2017). Some argue that terrorists were able to enter
EU territory by taking advantage of the European refugee crisis (Nabeel and Bhatti, 2016).
Migrants started to be associated as a threat to security following the terror attacks in Paris
on November 2015, Brussels on March 2016, Nice on July 2016, Berlin on December 2016,
Stockholm on April 2017, London on March/June 2017, and Manchester on May 2017, as well
as other incidents in various European countries. Public anxiety over immigration was also
at the center of discussions concerning the withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the
EU (popularly known as ‘Brexit’). On 23 June 2016, the British public made a decision via
referendum to leave the EU. Some studies find that immigration concerns strongly influenced
voters’ decisions (Arnorsson and Zoega, 2018; Clarke et al., 2017; Meleady et al., 2017). The
US presidential debates have focused over time on all issues related to migration (Mayda
et al., 2016), and immigration-related debates have been becoming more and more heated
since Donald Trump announced his candidacy for the White House in June 2015.
Motivated by the recent European migrant crisis, Brexit, and President Trump’s im-
migration priorities, we provide new evidence into how (i) migration fears and (ii) mi-
gration policy uncertainty affect macroeconomic outcomes across France, Germany, the
UK, and the US. We use the text-based immigration-related indices developed by Scott
R. Baker, Nick Bloom, and Steven J. Davis (see Baker et al., 2015) which are maintained at
www.policyuncertainty.com. The indices represent intensity of migration-related fears and
of migration-related policy uncertainty for France, Germany, the UK, and the US. These four
countries are among the largest migrant recipients in the world; in 2017, the largest number
of migrants resided in the US, Germany hosted the third largest, the UK hosted the fifth
largest, and France hosted the seventh largest. Moreover, these countries experienced large
increases in migration between 1990 and 2017 (United Nations, 2017). By using these mea-
sures, we investigate the impact of immigration-related fear and uncertainty on economic
activity via vector autoregression (VAR) models. We also explore the relationship between
the migration related uncertainty indices and other economic policy uncertainty indices.
The empirical analysis yields an interesting set of findings. Firstly, both migration related
indices are associated with decreases in industrial production in all countries except Germany.
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A surprise increase in the migration economic policy uncertainty (hereafter referred to as
‘MEPU’) index or the migration fear index (hereafter referred to as ‘MFI’) leads to a drop
of industrial production, followed by a rebound towards the pre-shock levels in France, the
UK, and the US. This decline and rebound effect is more pronounced in France. This finding
is consistent with the literature that establishes that empirical measures of general economic
uncertainty or policy uncertainty behave countercyclically to aggregate economic activity in
many industrialized countries (including Germany). Alexopoulos and Cohen (2008, 2009)
find that output, employment, productivity, consumption and investment all decrease in
response to an unanticipated rise in uncertainty. Baker et al. (2016) find that increases in a
news-based index of policy uncertainty are negatively correlated with aggregate employment,
output, and investment in the US and a number of other industrialized countries. In the case
of Germany, Bachmann et al. (2013) plot impulse responses of manufacturing production
to surprise increases in different uncertainty measures and find that there is a decline in
manufacturing production followed by a relatively quick and rebound. While we find such
decline and rebound behavior for France, the UK, and the US; Germany stands as an outlier.
We discuss in Section 3 that robust economic performance of Germany, which includes
reforms that have targeted the system of industrial relations, and dispersion of industrial
production can explain to some extent why surprise increases in the MEPU index or the
MFI do not foreshadow industrial production.
Secondly, innovations in the MFI, in every case and for every country, are associated with
decreases in unemployment. Put plainly, increases in immigration-related fears are associated
with higher employment levels. This finding does not support the popular belief that there
are adverse effects on employment from immigration and related concerns.1 It is important
to emphasize that we are studying the effects of the increases in immigration-related fears
not the actual immigration flows. With this in mind our findings provide additional evidence
to studies that have found no positive correlation between unemployment and the share of
immigrants in a country.2 We also find that unemployment exhibits a weak hump-shaped
impulse response to an innovation in MEPU in France and the US. This result can also be
reconciled with findings of some studies that show adverse effects from immigration to the
1For example, at a Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Front campaign, a retired worker stated “they are
going to invade us. Then, there really will be unemployment.” (Nossiter, 2015). Edo et al. (2017), using
panel data on presidential elections from 1998 to 2017, estimate the impact of immigration on voting for
far-left and far-right parties in France and find that immigration increases support for far-right candidates
and has no robust effect on far-left voting.
2The impact of immigration on the labor market outcomes of native-born workers has been a central
issue of public debate in traditional receiving countries, such as France, Germany, the UK, and the US. The
main concern is that immigration can reduce the employment opportunities of native workers. Many studies
conclude either very moderate effects or a lack of effect of immigration on unemployment. See Friedberg and
Hunt, 1995; Okkerse, 2008; Constant, 2014; Edo et al., 2018 and the references therein.
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labor market in the short to medium term (see Gross, 2002).3
Thirdly, for each country, our findings indicate that a relatively significant fraction of
the movements in unemployment at long horizons are due to migration-related ‘fear’ shocks
as opposed to migration-related ‘uncertainty’ shocks. The MFI dominates the forecast error
variance decomposition at the forecast horizon (of 40 quarters) in each country for unemploy-
ment, meaning that it explains far more of the variance in unemployment than the MEPU
index. On the other hand, the MEPU index dominates the forecast error variance decom-
position at the forecast horizon (of 40 quarters) for industrial production in every country
except Germany.
Finally, we look at the relationship between the migration related indices and (i) economic
policy uncertainty (EPU) index of Baker et al. (2016) and (ii) the recently developed World
Uncertainty Index (WUI) à la Ahir et al. (2018). Our analysis shows that the level of
migration related uncertainty is positively associated with the EPU and the WUI. We also
study the impulse responses of the EPU index to surprise increases in MEPU and MFI in
our four country sample and note the significant and sizeable responses for France and the
UK. For example, we find that innovations in the MEPU index account for more than 60%
of the variance in the EPU in France and in the UK. We also run panel regressions between
stock market volatility and quarterly GDP growth rates against different uncertainty indices.
Both EPU and WUI are statistically significantly correlated with stock market volatility and
economic growth, and these associations are more pronounced when we use the WUI as a
measure of economic uncertainty. However, we do not find such significant correlations
between the migration related indices and economic growth. Our panel regressions results
show that the innovations to the migration related uncertainty indices do not foreshadow
weaker economic performance.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is one of the first attempts to characterize
the dynamic economic consequences of unexpected changes in intensity of migration-related
fears and of migration-related policy uncertainty. The economics of migration has been
a burgeoning field of academic research (see, among many others, the edited volumes by
Constant and Zimmermann, 2013; Chiswick and Miller, 2015) and there are many studies
in applied microeconomics and labor economics, which analyze the effects of immigration
flows on employment and wages. There are, however, relatively fewer studies that focus on
unanticipated increases in immigration on the macroeconomy (see, for example, Liu, 2010;
Kiguchi and Mountford, 2017; Furlanetto and Robstad, 2019 and the references therein).
In addition, our paper adds to the growing literature on the quantitative assessment of the
role exerted by a given uncertainty measure in explaining macroeconomic dynamics (see,
3In the long term, however, labor markets adjust and unemployment rates are brought down.
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among many others, Alexopoulos and Cohen, 2009, 2015; Bloom, 2009; Bachmann et al.,
2013; Baker et al., 2016; Charles et al., 2018; Born et al., 2018). There are also studies
that explicitly study the relationship between uncertainty (or economic policy uncertainty)
and unemployment (see, for example, Caggiano et al., 2014, 2017; Leduc and Liu, 2016;
Netšunajev and Glass, 2017).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents information for
MEPU and the MFI for Germany, France, the UK, and the US. Section 3 provides baseline
quantitative analysis. Section 4 presents a detailed robustness analysis of our findings.
Section 5 explores the correlations between the migration related uncertainty indices and
the general uncertainty indices. Section 6 provides further discussions of our results. Section
7 concludes.
2 Immigration fears and policy uncertainty
2.1 Constructing migration-related indices
Over the past decade, the role of uncertainty and its relationship with economic activity
have taken the spotlight among policymakers and economists alike. There is a growing
literature on developing text-based4 indicators that can be useful proxies for uncertainty,
given uncertainty is not directly observable. In one of the earliest contributions, Alexopoulos
and Cohen (2008, 2009) propose a new index of general economic uncertainty using the
number of articles that appear in the New York Times. The index uses the terms ‘uncertain’
and/or ‘uncertainty’ and ‘economic’ and/or ‘economy’.5 This approach has been well received
and expanded in a variety of ways by number researchers, most notably by Baker et al.
(2016).
Baker et al. (2016) measure economic policy uncertainty (EPU) across countries by
counting the number of occurrences of specific words or a sequence of words in certain news-
papers. The indices are updated regularly and are available publicly on the EPU website.6
On their website they frequently update a monthly global index as well as monthly indices
for more than 20 major world economies. Using similar methods to their EPU index, they
also provide two new quantitative indicators for the intensity of migration-related fears and
4Interest in text mining, i.e., the extraction of facts and opinions from a body of text, has gained mo-
mentum in economics in recent years. See Dyas-Correia and Alexopoulos (2014) and Gentzkow et al. (2017)
for comprehensive reviews.
5The empirical literature on uncertainty measures discusses various other measures. See, among many
others, Bloom, 2009; Bachmann et al., 2013; Jurado et al., 2015. Bloom (2014) provides a survey of the
main facts, recent contributions, and open questions about uncertainty.
6There are several other indices, in addition to the EPU indices, which are available on their website.
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migration-related policy uncertainty in France, Germany, the UK, and the US. The indices
are quarterly and extend back to 1990. To construct the migration fear and policy uncer-
tainty indices, Baker et al. first define the following term sets:
• Migration (M): border control, Schengen, open borders, migrant, migration, asylum,
refugee, immigrant, immigration, assimilation, human trafficking;
• Fear (F): anxiety, panic, bomb, fear, crime, terror, worry, concern, violent;
• Economy (E): economic, economy;
• Policy (P): regulation, deficit, white house, legislation, congress, federal reserve;
• Uncertainty (U): uncertainty, uncertain.
The number of newspaper articles with at least one term from each of the M and F term
sets is then divided by the total count of newspaper articles (in the same calendar quarter
and country). They construct their migration policy uncertainty index (MEPU) in the same
way, except they instead count articles with at least one term from each of M, E, P and U
term sets. The indices are normalized to a mean value of 100 from 1995 to 2011 (Baker et
al., 2015).
2.2 What do the migration indices tell us?
Figure 1 plots the MEPU index and the MFI for France between 1990:Q1 and 2019:Q1. The
correlation between these two series is 0.77. According to Baker et al. (2015) the spikes in
both indices around 1999 can be attributed to the Kosovo war refugees, and the volatile pe-
riod shortly after this captures uncertainty generated by 9/11 and the 2002 French elections.
The period between 2005 and 2007 is likely to have been influenced by the implementation
of a new immigration and integration law. The aim of the law was to better regulate and
promote selective immigration (Chou and Baygert, 2007). The 2007 French election of Nico-
las Sarkozy also may have played a role in heightening migration uncertainty around this
period. Uncertainty levels then remained relatively elevated until the 2012 French Elections
where we see a large spike in the migration policy uncertainty index yet no major movements
in the fear index. The period from 2014 onwards can be explained by the European refugee
crisis and terror attacks in 2015 and 2016.7
7On Nov 13, 2015, Paris was the scene of multiple mass casualty terrorist attacks, resulting in the deaths
of 137 people and injuring 413. On July 14, 2016, France was targeted again in the attack on Nice, resulting
in the deaths of 87 people and injuring 458 (Carli et al., 2017).
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Figure 2 plots the MEPU index and the MFI for Germany from 1990:Q1 to 2019:Q1.
The correlation between these two series is 0.73. We observe a series of significant spikes
in the MEPU index and the MFI which are likely to capture contentious migration related
events. The steady stream of East Germans migrating to West Germany in the 1980s rose
significantly in the early 1990s and after an immigration law amendment in 1993, the number
dropped off completely (Solsten, 1995, Chapter 3). In 1993 Germany amended its Basic Law
to restrict the right to asylum. Themes such as asylum, xenophobia and citizenship were
among the most controversial issues and topics debated in the 1990s (Koopmans, 1999). The
German Nationality Act of 2000 was approved in 1999 and came into force in 2000. This
expanded citizenship opportunities for long-term immigrants. The 2005 Immigration Act
was Germany’s first comprehensive law for managing continuing immigration, and extended
and simplified residency rights (Crage, 2016). In 2012, Germany simplified the process for
immigrants from outside the EU and in 2013, the government launched a special program
aimed at young, unemployed Europeans ages 18 to 35, covering their travel, language courses
and living costs while offering them vocational training in Germany (Faiola, 2014). Many
European countries have now anti-immigrant parties in their parliaments and Germany is no
exception. The right-wing populist party ‘Alternative for Germany’ (AfD), founded in 2013,
was elected into the national parliament for the first time and promptly secured more than
12% of the seats, making it the third largest party after the general elections in September
2017.8
Figure 3 plots the MEPU index and the MFI for the UK between 1990:Q1 and 2019:Q1.
There is a high correlation between these two series of 0.90. At a glance, both series seem to
be less volatile than Germany, although both indices may be trending upwards, especially
after 2000. The first grouping of major spikes comes from the fear index (around 1999)
which can be attributed to the Kosovo War refugees. According to Baker et al. (2015), the
spikes in both indices in 2003 may be due to Prime Minister Tony Blair promising tougher
immigration.9 The following upward trends in both indices could be due to an accumulation
of factors: the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, the 2010 General Election of
the Conservative party led by David Cameron, the success of the UK Independence Party
(Ukip) in the 2014 European Parliament elections,10 the European migrant crisis and 2015
Paris terror attacks. On the 23rd of June 2016, the UK held a nationwide referendum on its
membership in the EU, and a majority of 51.9% voted to leave the EU. Immigration played
8https://globalriskinsights.com/2018/02/elections-political-insecurity-germany/
9In February 2003, Blair promised on live television to reduce the number of asylum seekers by half within
7 months (Mann, 2003).
10Ukip claimed nearly 28% of the vote share with its main agenda focused on migration reform (Kirkup
and Swinford, 2014).
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a central role in the Brexit campaign: Goodwin and Heath (2016) report 88% of people who
thought the UK should admit fewer immigrants supported Brexit. Meleady et al. (2017)
discuss that prejudice against immigrant from the EU was a major deciding factor in the
Brexit referendum and provide empirical support for the presumed role of anti-immigrant
prejudice in Britain’s decision to leave the EU.11
Figure 4 plots the MEPU index and the MFI for the US between 1990:Q1 and 2019:Q1.
The correlation between these two series is 0.69. Appointed by Bill Clinton the U.S. Com-
mission on Immigration Reform ran from 1990 to 1997 and recommended reducing legal
immigration from about 800,000 people per year to approximately 550,000 (Jones, 2004,
p.153). This may explain some of the volatility in the indices during 1990-1997. The initial
spikes around 1995 capture policy changes to address the mass exodus of people from Cuba
in the summer of 1994.12 The large spike in the fear index in 1999 represents the Kosovo war
refugees, followed closely by another spike during 9/11. Both indices spike together during
the comprehensive immigration reform act, and a large spike in the MEPU in 2012 stems
from an Arizona law change which increased deportations. We see a few more spikes around
the 2012 elections and the comprehensive immigration reform act, before further spikes rep-
resenting the European refugee crisis, the Paris attacks in 2015, the 2015 San Bernardino
attack,13 2016 Orlando nightclub shooting,14 and the period leading up to the 2016 US
election, in which strict promises of migration control and debates around migration levels
were frequent. In January 2017, newly elected President Trump signed an executive order
temporarily suspending entry to the US by nationals of certain Muslim majority countries.15
Another migration related executive order from President Trump recently called for the im-
mediate construction of a wall across the US-Mexico border. This also called for the hiring
of 5,000 new border patrol agents and 10,000 new immigration officers (Korte and Jackson,
2017).
11Sampson (2017) provides an overview of the available studies and argues that “support for Brexit came
from a coalition of less-educated, older, less-economically successful and more socially conservative voters
who oppose immigration and feel left behind by modern life” (Sampson, 2017, p.164).
12See Bruno (2016) for details regarding the Cuban Migration Accords of 1994 and 1995.
1314 people were killed and 22 others were injured in a shooting rampage in San Bernardino, California
on December 2, 2015. The gunmen were motivated by radical Islamist beliefs, according to the FBI (http:
//www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-california-shootings-20160104-story.html).
1449 people were killed and more than 50 others were injured at a nightclub in Orlando, Florida, on June





3.1 Data and empirical strategy
Our sample is quarterly and runs from 1991:Q1 to 2018:Q3 for each country.16 Both
immigration-related uncertainty indices, which are available at a quarterly frequency, are
taken from the migration fears and EPU website.17 We study two main economic activity
variables: (i) industrial production index (seasonally adjusted, 2010=100) and (ii) harmo-
nized unemployment rate (percentage). Both series are from the OECD’s “Key Short-Term
Economic Indicators.”18 All variables are expressed in logs except the unemployment rates.
Our quantitative analysis is based on reporting impulse response functions (IRFs) and
forecast error variance decompositions (FEVDs) from recursively-identified bivariate VARs
featuring an uncertainty index and a measure of economic activity. In the words of Blanchard
(1987, p.450): “In traditional VARs, individual equations are of no particular interest; only
the system of equations as whole is. Impulse responses and variance decompositions more
or less exhaust the description of the dynamics properties of that system.” We opt for the
Choleski decomposition, which delivers orthogonal shocks in a recursive structure that is
determined by the order in which the variables are listed in the VAR, in a way consistent
with Bloom (2009), Bachmann et al. (2013), Baker et al. (2016), Girardi and Reuter
(2017), Charles et al. (2018). We order the immigration-related uncertainty indices first in
a recursive identification, which implies that a shock to the index will effect the measure of
economic activity contemporaneously, while the movement in the activity variable will not
effect the uncertainty index contemporaneously.
3.2 Impulse response functions
Figures 5-8 plot impulse responses of economic activity variables (industrial production and
unemployment) to surprise increases in migration EPU (hereafter referred to as MEPU) and
migration fear in France, Germany, the UK, and the US, respectively. The impulse responses
of industrial production are expressed in percent and the unemployment rate is expressed in
percentage points. The VARs are estimated with 4 lags, and all economic activity variables
enter the systems in levels. The sample period for all VARs is common from 1991:Q1 to
2018:Q3. The shaded areas represent one-standard-error bias-corrected bootstrap confidence
16Migration related uncertainty indices start from 1990. Data for economic activity variables for Germany





bands of Kilian (1998) and obtained using the MEPU index as the uncertainty measure.19,20
Sizes of all shocks are one standard deviation.
Panel (a) in Figure 5 shows that industrial production responds very quickly to an in-
crease in immigration-related uncertainty in France. It starts declining almost immediately
and, depending on the uncertainty index used to identify the corresponding shock: it is
0.65% below the pre-shock level about 7 quarters after the impact of the MEPU shock, and
it bottoms at 0.4% below the pre-shock level about 20 quarters after the impact of the MFI
shock. Panel (b) in Figure 5 shows that unemployment exhibits a weak hump-shaped re-
sponse to an innovation in MEPU, but the results are not statistically significant. An MFI
shock leads to a drop in the unemployment rate, which reaches a peak fall of 0.11 percent
points below trend at around 9 quarters after the impact of the MFI shock, and then is
followed by a rebound.
Figure 6 shows that an MFI shock has very small immediate implications for both indus-
trial production and unemployment in Germany. The small immediate effects are followed
by slow building, significant, and apparently permanent responses of both industrial produc-
tion and unemployment. A one-standard-deviation innovation to the MFI predicts a level
of industrial production that is 1.6% higher after 30 quarters, and predicts a level of the
unemployment rate that is 0.30 percent points lower after about 15 quarters. The size of
the effects of uncertainty is notably lower with MEPU on both industrial production and
unemployment than with the MFI. A one-standard-deviation innovation to MEPU predicts
level of industrial production that is 0.49% higher after 5 quarters. Industrial production
increases and unemployment decreases as responses to surprise increases in immigration-
related indices.21 Merging panel data from the German Socio-Economic Panel with detailed
information on local labor markets between 1998 and 2009, Akay et al. (2014) find that in-
creases in immigration have a positive and robust effect on natives’ well-being. Our findings
for Germany abandon traditional uncertainty literature but support the findings of Akay
et al. (2014). Both the increases in MEPU and the MFI index are associated with higher
economic activity, which in most cases, will lead to higher well-being.
Panel (a) of Figure 7 plots impulse responses of industrial production to positive standard
19Kilian’s method is the bootstrap-after-bootstrap method to derive the confidence intervals (from 2000
bias-corrected bootstrap replications of the reduced form VARs) of the IRFs. These bias-corrected bootstrap
confidence intervals explicitly account for the bias and skewness of the small-sample distribution of the
impulse response estimator. This procedure also performs well regardless of whether variables are estimated
in levels, deviations from a linear trend or first differences.
20Our quantitative strategy is in line with those of Barsky and Sims (2011, 2012), Bachmann et al. (2013),
and Charles et al. (2018).
21Pischke and Velling (1997) study substitution effects between immigrant and natives across local labor
markets in Germany and their results indicate no detrimental effect of immigration.
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deviation sized shocks in both the MEPU and the MFI in the UK. Both index-induced paths
of industrial production follow a similar path characterized by a small increase on impact,
followed by a long decrease over the 5-year forecast horizon. Panel (b) plots impulse responses
of unemployment to positive standard deviation sized shocks in both the MEPU and the
MFI. Both indices predict a very similar path, decreasing unemployment significantly to a
peak decrease of around 0.12 percent points at about 11 quarters for MEPU and of around
0.12 percentage points at about 16 quarters for the MFI. The impact of the MFI shocks is
more persistent for unemployment in the UK. Blanchflower and Shadforth (2009) study the
hypothesis that higher UK migration inflows increase the ‘fear’ of unemployment and lowers
wages. They also study the impact on the UK economy of the flow of workers from ten East
European countries after their accession to the EU and argue that this inflow of workers
reduced the natural rate of unemployment. Perhaps decreases in unemployment induced by
a shock to ‘fear’ is just anticipation of this process. Our findings for unemployment in the
UK are consistent with those of several other studies. Dustmann et al. (2005) find evidence
that immigration has no effect on unemployment in the UK.22 If immigration truly has no
effect on unemployment; neither an increase nor a decrease, then that may explain why our
results are relatively insignificant for the UK.
Panel (a) of Figure 8 shows that, for the case of the US, a shock to the MEPU index
causes industrial production to decrease, with a peak fall of around -0.38% after three quar-
ters. A one-standard-deviation innovation to the MEPU index predicts a level of industrial
production that is 0.41% higher than the pre-shock level after 25 quarters. A shock to the
MFI, however, increases the level of industrial production in the very short-run. Industrial
production decreases steadily but is still above its pre-shock level of almost 0.05% after 40
quarters. Responses of unemployment to innovations in the immigration-related uncertainty
in the US are similar to those of France. Panel (b) of Figure 8 shows the response of unem-
ployment to shocks to the immigration-related uncertainty measures. A shock in the MFI
reduces unemployment in the short-run and the contraction in unemployment peaks around
two years after the shock (at -0.19 percent points). This is then gradually absorbed, and
dies out in the long-run. Unemployment exhibits a hump-shaped response to an innovation
in MEPU, peaking around a year (at 0.06 percent points),23 then gradually declining. After
5 years, unemployment is below its pre-shock level by 0.06 percent points.
22Portes (2018) also argues that “there is now a clear consensus that even in the short-term migration
does not appear to have had a negative impact on the employment outcomes of UK natives.”
23Kiguchi and Mountford (2017) estimate an eight-variable (GDP, private consumption, nonresident invest-
ment, residential investment, unemployment, hours worked, real wages, and the numbers of new permanent
residents) VAR system with annual data from 1950 to 2005 and find that unemployment temporarily rises
in response to an immigration shock.
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In France, and the UK we observe a decline in industrial production while the unemploy-
ment rate falls, in response to positive innovations in the MFI. A particular explanation for
this is finding could be the structural transformation. The reallocation of resources across
the broad economic sectors agriculture, industry, and services is a prominent feature of eco-
nomic development. The share of industrial employment has been declining for more than
three decades in today’s most advanced economies, a phenomenon that is referred to as “de-
industrialization”. In other words, labor has been moving away from industry to services.
We illustrate this in Figure 9. Figure 9 shows the evolution of the industrial employment24
share in France, Germany, the UK, and the US between 1991 and 2018. Data are from the
World Bank (2019) and we obtain a similar picture when we look at the value added shares
instead of the employment shares. In other words, production factors have been moving
from the industrial activities to the service sectors in France, Germany, the UK, and the
US. This may explain the declines in industrial production without creating detrimental
unemployment. In addition, decentralization of industrial production in Germany and the
success of the hidden champions helps explain the relatively high share of manufacturing in
Germany’s workforce and the slow pace of its decline shown in Figure 9.25
Decentralization of industrial production is a significant factor for Germany’s robust
economic performance. Dustman et al. (2014) show that Germany’s competitive position
relative to its main trading partners has persistently improved since 1995 because its wages
grew at a slower pace than productivity. They present evidence that the specific governance
structure of the German labor market institutions allowed them to react flexibly in a time
of global economic circumstances. This is due largely to the fact that the German economy
went through an unprecedented process of decentralization of wage bargaining during the
1990s. That is what led to a dramatic decline in unit labor costs, and ultimately increased
competitiveness. Germany’s hidden champions can explain the non-negative responses of
industrial production. Simon (2009, p. 15) defines a hidden champion as company which
is one of the top three in its global market, has less than $4 billion in revenue, and is
little known in the public. According to The Economist (2019) “at least two-thirds of the
hidden champions are in settlements below 50,000 people, and they are dotted throughout
Germany.”
24The industry sector consists of mining and quarrying, manufacturing, construction, and public utilities
(electricity, gas, and water).
25There are several alternative explanations for this phenomenon (such as trade with China, automation,
skilled-biased technological change, offshoring, etc.) Since our paper is not about the causes of structural
transformation we don’t delve into the details of the structural transformation in these countries.
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3.3 Forecast error variance decompositions
We can further assess the importance of the MFI and the MEPU on each economy’s in-
dustrial production and unemployment using forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD)
methodology. Using the VAR structure, we decompose the forecast error of the VAR along
different horizons, attributing portions of the error variance to immigration-related shocks.
Table 1 documents the FEVD attributable to MEPU and the MFI at various forecast hori-
zons (h=1, 4, 8, 40) in each country.26 The columns correspond to different measures of
uncertainty used in the bivariate VAR systems for each country. The rows show the fraction
(multiplied by 100) of the total forecast error variance of each economic activity variable of
each country due to innovations in uncertainty, where the uncertainty series is ordered first
in a recursive identification.
Panel (a) in Table 1 shows that both indices explain a non-negligible amount of the
variance in industrial production at the 40-quarter horizon in France, yet the MEPU index
explains slightly more (16.83% vs. 6.91%). Both indices explain a relatively small amount
of variance in unemployment, but the innovations in the MFI explains more than three
times the amount of variance than the MEPU index does at the 40-quarter horizon (8.96%
vs 2.46%). Panel (b) shows that the MFI explains significantly more of the variance in
industrial production than the MEPU index does (30.61% vs. 2.47%) at the 40-quarter
horizon in Germany. Similarly, the MFI explains 41.86% of the variance in unemployment
whereas the MEPU index only explains 3.28% (at the 40-quarter horizon) in Germany. In
addition, the MFI explains more of the variance in unemployment than the MEPU index at
all forecast horizons (h=4, 8, 40) in Germany. All these suggest that the MFI innovations
clearly convey important information about the future time paths of industrial production
and unemployment in Germany, and most notably, at longer horizons. Regarding the UK
(panel c), the contributions of MEPU shocks to the volatility of industrial production are
almost negligible in the short run. However, in the long-run, i.e., the 40-quarter ahead
FEVD, the contribution of MEPU shocks to the volatility of industrial production is as high
as 30.13%, and it is slightly larger than that of the MFI shocks (24.53%). The MEPU index
tends to explain more variance in unemployment in the short-run in the UK. However, the
MFI explains more of the variance in unemployment (13.80% vs. 10.98%) at the 40-quarter
horizon. Regarding the US (panel d), the contributions of the MFI shocks to the volatility
of industrial production are small in the short run. After the initial impact, at every forecast
horizon (h=4, 8, 40), the MFI explains significantly more of the variance in unemployment
and ultimately explains 13.41% of the variance at the 40-quarter forecast horizon.
26Again, the sample period for all VARs is common from 1991:Q1-2018:Q3. The VARs are estimated with
4 lags, and all economic activity variables enter the systems in levels.
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4 Robustness checks
There are several robustness checks, which can be performed in order to make sure the re-
sults we present hold under different assumptions and specifications. Firstly, we compare the
robustness of our results under different lag specifications. Secondly, we examine whether
the effect of uncertainty on economic activity is different over time by estimating dynamic
responses of economic activity variables to innovations in uncertainty on two subsamples.
Thirdly, we ask to what extent, are innovations in migration fear simply reflective of infor-
mation already contained in industrial production and unemployment, and to address this
possibility, we reorder the variables in the system such that migration is fear orthogonal-
ized with respect to industrial production and unemployment (the index is ordered last).
Fourthly, we estimate a significantly larger VAR system for each country. Finally, we exam-
ine the exogeneity of immigration-related shocks.
4.1 Robustness to lag lengths
The dynamic properties of impulse responses may depend critically on the lag order of the
VAR model fitted to the data and there is no one criterion works best for all classes of models.
For example, Ivanov and Kilian (2005, p.1) state, “a number of such lag-order selection
criteria are in use in the empirical literature, yet little is known about their implications
for the accuracy of the implied impulse response estimates.” Figures 10-13 plot impulse
responses of industrial production and unemployment to surprise increases in migration fear
(MFI) in each country’s alternative lag structures. The VARs are estimated with 2, 4, or 6
lags, and all economic activity variables enter the systems in levels. The sample period for
all VARs is common from 1991:Q1-2018:Q3. The shaded areas represent one-standard-error
bias-corrected bootstrap confidence bands of Kilian (1998) and obtained from the system that
is estimated with 4 lags. The results appear to be robust using 2, 4, or 6 lags. The rebound
effect of unemployment’s response to surprise increases to the MFI is more pronounced in
France when we use 6 lags.
4.2 Subsample analysis
We analyze the dynamic responses of economic activity variables to innovations in migration
fear on two sub-samples, namely 1991:Q1-2018:Q3 (full sample) and 2001:Q3-2018:Q3 (post-
9/11 sample). The shaded region is the ± one standard error confidence band obtained from
the system that is estimated using the full sample. Figures 14-17 present the IRFs for the
two subsamples. The qualitative natures of the IRFs are similar in each case. That being
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said, the impulse responses of unemployment to the uncertainty shocks in migration fear are
stronger in the post-9/11 sample than in the full sample in the UK and the US.
4.3 Three-variable VARs and alternative orthogonalization
Here we present another robustness analysis, which is about reordering the variables in a
VAR system. We design this exercise in the context of three-variable VAR systems, in-
cluding industrial production, unemployment, and migration fear for each country. Firstly,
we consider a three-variable VAR, ordered as (1) the MFI, (2) industrial production, (3)
the unemployment rate. We then re-order the VAR as (1) industrial production, (2) the
unemployment rate, (3) the MFI. The sample period for all VARs is common from 1991:Q1-
2018:Q3. The VARs are estimated with 4 lags, and all economic activity variables enter the
systems in levels. Panel (a) and (b) in Figures 18-21 are the IRFs from a three-variable
VAR with migration fear, industrial production, and unemployment, where migration fear
is ordered first. The shaded areas represent one-standard-error bias-corrected bootstrap
confidence bands of Kilian (1998). Panel (c) and (d) in Figures 18-21 are the IRFs where
migration fear is ordered last. The qualitative features of the impulse responses are more
or less unaffected by the alternative orthogonalization and the results are in line with those
obtained from bi-variate VARs.
4.4 Impulse responses from larger VARs
As discussed in Bachmann et al. (2013), smaller VARs are parsimonious and can be more
credibly estimated and identified, but large VARs may be less prone to (potential) misspec-
ification problems. One can also argue that our sample sizes are too short for any model
larger than a bivariate model to be employed. Nevertheless, as a final robustness check to
our model specification, we present IRFs from a larger VAR with the measure of uncertainty
(MEPU or MFI) ordered second after the share price level as in Bloom (2009) and Bach-
mann et al. (2013). This choice of ordering implies that all variables except share price
index respond contemporaneously to an uncertainty shock.
Figures 22-25 present responses of industrial production and unemployment to surprise
increases in MEPU or the MFI in a way analogous to the bivariate VARs. The responses
are obtained from estimating the six variable system, which features the log level of share
prices, log of a measure of uncertainty, log industrial production, the unemployment rate,
the investment share of GDP, and the consumption share of GDP (in this order).27 The
27We tried alternative orders and obtained similar results. We also experimented cases including consumer
price index, short-term interest rates, and unit labor costs.
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sample period for all VARs is common from 1991:Q1-2018:Q3. The frequency of the series
in the VARs is quarterly, the VARs are estimated with 4 lags, and all economic activity
variables enter the systems in levels. The shaded areas represent one-standard-error bias-
corrected bootstrap confidence bands of Kilian (1998) and obtained using the MEPU index
as the uncertainty measure. The uncertainty series are ordered second after the share price
level, though results are largely invariant to this ordering assumption. Data for GDP, pri-
vate final consumption expenditure, and gross fixed capital formation are taken from the
OECD’s “Quarterly National Accounts (QNA).”28 All variables are in “national currency,
current prices, quarterly levels, and are seasonally adjusted.” We define the investment share
of GDP as the ratio of gross fixed capital formation to GDP and the consumption share of
GDP as the ratio of private final consumption expenditure to GDP. Both ratios are expressed
in percentages.29 Data for share price indices (2010=100) are from the OCED’s “Monthly
Monetary and Financial Statistics (MEI).”30 All other variables (industrial production, un-
employment, MEPU, the MFI) are the same as in Section 3.1. The responses of industrial
production and unemployment to increases in both immigration-related indices in these large
VAR systems are qualitatively similar to the ones obtained in bivariate VARs in each country.
The responses of unemployment in large VARs are somewhat less persistent than those in
the bivariate VARs, and this is not surprising since there are more autoregressive parameters
to estimate in large VARs.
4.5 On the exogeneity of immigration-related shocks
Our quantitative analysis follows the empirical literature that studies the causal effect of
uncertainty on the economy by using a recursive approach to identify uncertainty shocks in
VAR modelling (Bloom, 2009; Bachmann et al., 2013; Caggiano et al., 2014; Jurado et al.,
2015; Baker et al., 2016; Scotti, 2016). We place uncertainty (MEPU or MFI) first in the
ordering in our bivariate VAR models.31 One may argue to what extent the relationship
28http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=QNA
29Figures A1-A4 in Appendix A.1 plot impulse responses of investment and consumption shares of GDP to
surprise increases in MEPU and the MFI in each country. The impulse responses are expressed in percentage
points. The VARs are estimated with 4 lags, and all economic activity variables enter the systems in levels.
The sample period for all VARs is common from 1991:Q1 to 2018:Q3. The shaded areas represent one-
standard-error bias-corrected bootstrap confidence bands of Kilian (1998) and obtained using the MEPU
index as the uncertainty measure.
30http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MEI_FIN
31In an empirical study based on Norwegian data, Furlanetto and Robstad (2019) find that an exogenous
increase in immigration contributes to a decline in unemployment. Furlanetto and Robstad (2019) impose
two key sign restrictions to disentangle immigration shocks from other shocks: (i) an exogenous increase in
immigration would have a negative impact effect on wages; and (ii) an increase in immigration has a positive
effect on the labor force participation rate. They support these sign restrictions following the previous related
empirical using Norwegian data. We do not impose any sign restrictions. It is worth noting that empirical
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between each variable is causal. For example, a terrorist attack can generate increases in
migration-related fear and uncertainty, but could also be associated with beliefs that economy
will be negatively affected by the attack (see also Baker and Bloom, 2013; and Piffer and
Podstawski, 2018 for such a rationale).32
Inspired by Baker and Bloom (2013), we provide a simple test of exogeneity of the
migration-related shocks. Table 2 shows the regressions results to examine whether we
can find any predictive power for MEPU shocks using lagged industrial production and
unemployment rates. We present results for (i) the entire sample period of our bivariate
VARs (1991:Q1-2018:Q3), (ii) the period before the 2007-2009 global financial crisis (GFC)
(1991:Q1-2007:Q3), and (iii) the period after the GFC (2009:Q3-2018:Q3). We cannot say
with confidence that we find any predictive power for MEPU shocks using lagged industrial
production and unemployment rates because although some of the coefficients are statisti-
cally significant, most of the significant coefficients are barely significant at 10%. Based on
these findings we cannot conclusively argue that MEPU shocks appear to be predictable over
the quarterly horizon.
5 Relations with other measures of uncertainty
5.1 Some correlations
It is important to analyze the effects of the changes in the migration related indices on other
measures of uncertainty given the possibility that migration fears and uncertainty might
simply reflect general economic policy uncertainty. In this section we explore the relationship
between MEPU/MFI and EPU. As we discussed in Section 2, Baker et al. (2016) extend
the notion of uncertainty to include economic policy uncertainty (EPU). The researchers
construct indices for EPU based on the frequency of terms related to policy uncertainty
in newspaper articles. Recently, Ahir et al. (2018) use Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU)
reports to construct a new index of uncertainty–the World Uncertainty Index (WUI)–for 143
countries on a quarterly basis from 1996 onwards. In contrast to the existing measure of
the EPU, the WUI is based on a single source. The WUI is defined using the frequency of
the word ‘uncertainty’ (and its variants) in the quarterly EIU country reports. To make the
literature does not reach a consensus about the effects of immigration on wages paid to natives. Borjas
(2003, 2013) find a negative impact of immigration on wages, while Card (2009) and Ottaviano and Peri
(2012) do not.
32Isolating exogenous variations in uncertainty is a challenge (see Stock and Watson (2012) for a discus-
sion). Piffer and Podstawski (2018) propose a new instrument for the uncertainty shock by exploiting the
variations in the price of gold. They argue that the price of a safe haven asset (i.e., gold) should emphasize
the uncertainty-related component of the events. This helps separate uncertainty shocks from news shocks.
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WUI comparable across countries, the raw count is scaled by the total number of words in
each report.33
Are the levels of migration related uncertainty indices correlated with the EPU and/or
WUI? We design the following exercise using the quarterly data of EPU and WUI from Ahir
et al. (2018) for the sample period of 1996:Q1-2017:Q4.34 We regress EPU on the MEPU and
MFI separately in a panel framework of four countries of which we have data for the MEPU
and MFI. We study specifications with and without country fixed effects. Then, we run
the same regressions using the WUI as the dependent variable instead of the EPU. Results
are presented in Table 3. We find that there is a strong statistically significant relationship
when regressing EPU (or WUI) on MEPU (or MFI) in a panel framework of four countries,
and also purging for country fixed effects. These findings suggest that the level of migration
related uncertainty is positively associated with economic policy uncertainty and the world
uncertainty indices.
5.2 Migration related uncertainty indices versus EPU
To further explore the relationship between the migration related uncertainty indices and
the EPU we report IRFs and FEVDs from recursively-identified VARs featuring MEPU
(or MFI) and the EPU. Figure 26 plots impulse responses of EPU to surprise increases in
MEPU and MFI in France, Germany, the UK, and the US. The impulse responses of EPU
are expressed in percent. The VARs are estimated with 4 lags, and all variables enter the
systems in levels (in logarithms). The sample period for all VARs is common from 1996:Q1
to 2017:Q4 (except the UK case, which is 1997:Q1 to 2017:Q4). The shaded areas represent
one-standard-error bias-corrected bootstrap confidence bands of Kilian (1998) and obtained
using the MEPU index as the uncertainty measure. Sizes of all shocks are one standard
deviation. Significant and sizeable responses are noted for France and the UK.
Next, we further assess the importance of the MFI and the MEPU on each economy’s
EPU using the FEVD method. Using the VAR structure, we decompose the forecast error of
the VAR along different horizons, attributing portions of the error variance to immigration-
related shocks. Table 4 documents the FEVD attributable to MEPU and the MFI at various
forecast horizons in each country. Both indices explain a significant amount of the variance
in EPU at the 40-quarter horizon in France, yet the MEPU index explains slightly more
(61.49% vs. 44.34%). Innovations in the MFI explain more than six times the amount of
variance than the MEPU index does at the 40-quarter horizon in Germany. Both the MEPU
33http://www.policyuncertainty.com/wui_quarterly.html
34Quarterly data for the EPU and WUI are from Ahir et al. (2018), which are available at Nicholas
Bloom’s website (https://nbloom.people.stanford.edu/research).
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index and MFI explain more than 60% of the variance in EPU in the UK at the 40-quarter
horizon. The MEPU explains more of the variance in EPU than the MFI at all forecast
horizons in the US.
5.3 Migration related uncertainty indices and growth
One final exercise we present is the correlations of alternate indices with stock market volatil-
ity and economic growth.35 We follow Ahir et al. (2018) and run panel regressions between
the stock market volatility and different uncertainty indices, also allowing for country fixed
effects. We also run similar regressions using annualized quarterly GDP growth as the depen-
dent variable instead of stock market volatility. Table 5 presents interesting set of findings.
Both EPU and WUI are statistically significantly correlated with stock market volatility and
economic growth, and these associations are more pronounced when we use the WUI as a
measure of uncertainty. However, we do not find such significant correlations between the
migration related indices and economic growth. The lack of association between the migra-
tion related indices and stock market volatility is also observed, except for specification (II)
where the related coefficient is significant at 10%.36
Motivated by these findings, we further explore the relationship between uncertainty and
economic activity using panel VAR analysis. We fit a VAR to a quarterly panel of 4 countries
from 1996:Q1 to 2017:Q4. We follow Ahir et al. (2018) and use a Cholesky decomposition
with the following order: the log of average stock return, the uncertainty index (EPU or WUI
or MEPU or MFI) and GDP growth. Our specification includes four lags of all variables.
Country and time fixed effects are also included. Figure 27 reports the model-implied impulse
response of GDP to a one-standard deviation increase in the related uncertainty index and
the associated 90 percent confidence bands. The last two panels show that the response
of output is statistically insignificant through the entire estimation horizon. On the other
hand, panel (a) shows that the initial response of GDP is statistically significant against the
WUI innovations. Our findings in panel (a) for four countries are consistent with those of
Ahir et al. (2018) when they use a panel of 46 countries. While we refrain in giving causal
interpretations to these results, results in panel (c) and panel (d) show that the innovations to
the migration related uncertainty indices do not foreshadow weaker economic performance.
35Quarterly data for stock market volatility and economic growth are from Ahir et al. (2018).
36Antonakakis et al. (2017) examine whether US stock returns and volatility can be predicted from a
set of uncertainty indices as well as the same migration-related uncertainty indices we use. They find that
migration-related uncertainties increases stock market volatility in the US. In a footnote they state that they
also look at Germany, France, and the UK and find that migration-related measures only possess predictive
information for UK stock returns.
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6 Further discussions
6.1 Correlations with the actual migration flows
Throughout this paper, many parallels have been drawn to the economic effect of migration
itself, and it is important to remember that sentiment towards migration and migration
flows are separate. To investigate the results further, it might be informative to see whether
the indices are correlated with actual migration flows. If a country’s migration-related fear,
or uncertainty, is correlated with its migration flows, then the migration itself may explain
some of the changes in economic activity. Furthermore, we may expect these countries to
have highly significant VAR results given that the fear/uncertainty is of actual migration
and in this case, firms and businesses may be more likely to re-act.37 Table 6 addresses this
concern.
The correlations we report in Table 6 are Pearson’s correlation coefficients, which measure
the amount of linear dependence between two series. One immediate point regarding the
associations observed in the data for each country is the concern that reported correlations
will change if one takes the logarithms since taking logarithm can be thought as a nonlinear
transformation (and therefore general correlations will change). In addition, because we
estimate our VARs in logs, we also address this concern by providing correlations between
the logs of the variables in Table 6. The qualitative nature of our results (relative size and
significance) remains the same.
The data is compiled from the OECD’s International Migration Database which provides
annual data on migration flows and stocks in OECD countries.38 We use the variable “in-
flows of foreign population by nationality” for each of the four countries between 1990 and
2016. As the migration-related uncertainty indices are available in quarterly frequencies,
and quarterly migration flows are not available, we transform MEPU and the MFI to their
annual counterparts by taking the 4-quarter average within each year for each country.
Panel (a) of Table 6 reports the correlations between variables in levels. Germany, France,
and the UK all have high and significant correlations. The US, on the other hand, has very
low (and insignificant) correlations between migration inflow, the migration fear and migra-
tion policy uncertainty indices. In France, the MFI and the MEPU are highly correlated
with each other (0.93) and have a correlation with migration inflows of 0.78 and 0.67, re-
spectively. This is not surprising as the bivariate VAR results for France are notable and
37Due to the ‘text-search news-based’ construction methods of our indices, fears and uncertainty
may be generated without any actual migration and these indices may capture sentiments other than
fears/uncertainty of domestic migration flows (e.g., fear about migration in foreign countries, fear of lower
migration, uncertainty about deportation schemes, etc.).
38http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIG#
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significant. This supports our view that if the indices are correlated with actual migration
inflows, then it is likely that the heightened ‘fears’ and ‘uncertainties’ in these countries are
genuine and therefore economic activity is more likely to react. The indices for Germany
are also highly (and significantly) correlated with migration inflows, implying a similar story
to that of France. It is interesting to note that in Germany, the MFI is far more highly
correlated with migration inflows than the MEPU index is and also, the correlation between
the MFI and inflows (0.82) is much higher than the correlation between the MFI and the
MEPU index (0.76). This could be the reason why the German migration policy uncertainty
index is relatively insignificant in bivariate VARs. UK results show, again, highly significant
and correlated indices. However, the correlations for the UK are overall less than those of
France and Germany. In the US, the MFI and the MEPU are correlated with each other
(0.52). However, the correlation between the MEPU (or the MFI) and inflows is insignificant
in the US. The results for the US are insignificant and correlated to a very low degree. This
could explain why the VAR results for the US are insignificant. Panel (b) of Table 6 shows
results of correlations between migration inflows and the migration fear and uncertainty in-
dices where all variables are expressed in natural logs. This is performed as a robustness
measure given that our VARs are estimated in logs. The qualitative nature of our results
(relative size and significance) remains similar. In other words, whether the variables are
expressed in levels or logs does not affect the nature of the correlations between the variables
and therefore the discussions based on Panel (a) of Table 6 are valid and still hold.
Our findings regarding unemployment are also consistent with those found in the analysis
of natural experiments in labor economics, wherein immigration inflows occur independent of
economic conditions.39 A well-known study of Card (1990) examines the 1980 Mariel boatlift
from Cuba, in which some 125,000 Cuban immigrants suddenly arrived in Miami, on the
Miami labor market in the US. Card finds virtually no impact on the labor market outcomes
of native workers, a result that may support our findings of higher economic activity, and
our findings of statistical insignificance.40 Hunt (1992) studies the influx of repatriates from
Algeria to France in 1962 to examine the effects of immigration on the labor market, and
finds only small effects of the 900,000 people repatriated from Algeria to France in 1962 and
39Blau and Kahn (2015) and Tumen (2015) provide surveys of the natural experiment approach in migra-
tion research. There is also a growing interest towards the use of natural experiments in macroeconomics
(see Fuchs-Schündeln and Hassan (2016) for a comprehensive survey). Regarding immigration, Burchardi
et al. (2017), Cohen et al. (2017), and Parsons and Vézina (2018) evaluate the causal impact of migrant
networks on the variation in international trade and foreign direct investment across locations in the US.
40Borjas (2017) and Peri and Yasenov (2017) reappraise the Mariel boatlift immigration episode. Borjas
(2017) argues that there is evidence of large negative effects for high school dropouts, while Peri and Yasenov
(2017) confirm the early findings of Card (1990). National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine
(2017) provides a comprehensive discussion of these studies.
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estimates that the repatriates increased the 1968 unemployment of non-repatriates by at
most 0.3 percentage points.41
6.2 Evidence from surveys
An important finding that comes out of our analysis is that increased migration fears or
migration-related policy uncertainty does not have detrimental effects on the German econ-
omy. International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2015) provides an insight into public
attitudes towards immigration worldwide, presenting findings based on interviews with over
183,000 adults across more than 140 countries between 2012 and 2014. In general, people
in Europe appear to be the most negative towards migration, with the majority (52%) of
respondents believing that immigration should decrease (IOM, 2015, p.2). Table 7 presents
the distribution of responses in France, Germany, the UK, and the US for the following
question: “In your view, should immigration in this country be kept at its present level,
increased or decreased?” A significant portion of adults in the UK (69%), France (44%), and
the US (40%) say that immigration levels should decrease. Public sentiment in Germany,
however, more positive, with nearly half of Germans (49%) saying immigration should be
kept at present levels, and another 14% saying it should be increased. This more positive
public sentiment toward immigration in Germany is also confirmed in another poll. Accord-
ing to a 2016 Project poll,42 57% of Germans are not convinced that migration will decrease
jobs available for German citizens.43,44 This finding is also consistent with an analysis of all
16 German states (Bundesländer) that shows that those states with higher migrant popu-
lations have lower unemployment and higher levels of risk capital investment. For example,
Berlin is the state (i) that has the highest percentage of residents who are foreign-born, and
(ii) with the highest number of firms receiving venture capital.45 It would be a particularly
interesting question for future research to examine if relatively a more positive attitude to-
wards immigrants in Germany could explain the positive (negative) responses of industrial
production (unemployment) to immigration-related uncertainty and fear.
In each of the countries we study, migration fear indices show a steady rise, with spikes
41Friedberg (2001) studies the effect of Russian immigrants on the Israeli labor market during the 1990s
and finds no evidence of an adverse effect of Russian immigrants on the wages and unemployment of Israeli
natives. In Europe, Angrist and Kugler (2003) find a slight reduction in native employment rates, i.e., an
increase in the foreign share of 10% would reduce native employment rates by 0.2-0.7 of a percentage point,
with a larger effect observed in countries where product markets are more restricted to competition.
42http://project28.eu/results/
43The exact question is Please tell me if you find this statement to be true or untrue: The influx of
immigrants to the country will decrease jobs available for the citizens.
44On the contrary, 62% of respondents in the UK are convinced that migration will decrease jobs available
for the citizens.
45Data are available at https://www.movinga.de/en/foreign-human-capital/
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at the time of elections or terrorists attacks. Our findings suggest that such increases in
immigration-related fear indices are not associated with an increase in unemployment rates.
IOM (2015) may also provide an insight to interpret the findings that unemployment de-
creases as a response to migration ‘fear’ shocks. Table 8 presents the distribution of responses
in France, Germany, the UK, and the US for the following question: “Do you think immi-
grants mostly take jobs that citizens in this country do not want (e.g. low-paying or not
prestigious jobs) or mostly take jobs that citizens in this country want?” The residents of
each economy are much more likely to say immigrants take jobs citizens do not want than
take jobs that citizens want. We interpret these figures as the respondents’ perception that
immigrant workers are complements for native-born workers instead of being substitutes.46
Such an interpretation is consistent with the findings of Furlanetto and Robstad (2019) for
Norway. Furlanetto and Robstad do not find any evidence in favor of displacement effects
and their results indicate a high degree of complementarity between domestic and foreign
workers in Norway.
7 Concluding remarks
The dynamic relationship between the economic activity and uncertainty is fascinating to
explore, partly because uncertainty is unobservable, and therefore finding a method of quan-
tification is, in itself, a matter for scrutiny and debate, but also because uncertainty can
have dramatic effects on the real economy. Motivated by the recent migrant crisis, Brexit,
and President Trump’s immigration priorities, and to the best of our knowledge, we pro-
vide new evidence into how migration related fear and migration related uncertainty effect
macroeconomic activity in France, Germany, the UK and the US.
We find that the size of the fluctuations in economic activity are reasonably diverse across
the four countries. This implies that the effects migration fear and migration policy uncer-
tainty depend on institutional and other economic differences between these four countries.
We also find that for every country, positive innovations in the migration fear index lead
to lower unemployment. We also show that the migration fear index is relatively correlated
with actual migration flows. Given that migration often depends on the relative health of
a given nation’s economy, it is fair to assume that countries with low unemployment rates
may attract more migrants, and therefore could in turn, generate migration fear. It is also
important to remember that most of the results are fairly insignificant. In the context of the
46These four countries belong to the high-income group according to the World Bank. According to IOM
(2015), the residents of high-income economies overall are much more likely to say immigrants take jobs
citizens do not want (58%) than take jobs that citizens want (17%). In all other economies, residents are
more likely to say immigrants take the jobs that citizens want.
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world we live in today, this is a comforting result if it means that migration sentiment has
a negligible effect on economic activity, but this paper simply acts as an introduction to the
dynamic economic effects of migration sentiment and further research should be applied to
this area to substantiate these conclusions.
Any further work could benefit from using a more specified model, or a different theoret-
ical framework. Exploring different fear/uncertainty quantification methods would also be a
worthwhile exercise. Further contributions to this niche of literature will go a long way to
not only helping understand how ‘fears’ are generated, and how economic agents react, but
also to guiding government entities and state actors to construct policy in a manner which
aligns with the interest of providing certainty to the markets they govern.
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Figure 4: US: Migration EPU and Fear Indices, 1990:Q1-2019:Q1
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(a): Production to Uncertainty
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Figure 5: France: Migration EPU vs. Migration Fear
(a): Production to Uncertainty
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Figure 6: Germany: Migration EPU vs. Migration Fear
32
(a): Production to Uncertainty
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Figure 7: United Kingdom: Migration EPU vs. Migration Fear
(a): Production to Uncertainty
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Figure 8: United States: Migration EPU vs. Migration Fear
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Figure 10: France: Migration Fear and Economic Activity: Lag Lengths
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Figure 11: Germany: Migration Fear and Economic Activity: Lag Lengths
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Figure 12: UK: Migration Fear and Economic Activity: Lag Lengths
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Figure 13: US: Migration Fear and Economic Activity: Lag Lengths
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Figure 14: France: Migration Fear and Economic Activity: Subsamples
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Figure 15: Germany: Migration Fear and Economic Activity: Subsamples
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Figure 16: UK: Migration Fear and Economic Activity: Subsamples
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Figure 17: US: Migration Fear and Economic Activity: Subsamples
(a): Production to Fear










(b): Unemployment to Fear














(c): Production to Fear










(d): Unemployment to Fear














Figure 18: France: Responses to Migration Fear Innovation, Ordered First or Last
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Figure 19: Germany: Responses to Migration Fear Innovation, Ordered First or Last
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Figure 20: UK: Responses to Migration Fear Innovation, Ordered First or Last
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Figure 21: US: Responses to Migration Fear Innovation, Ordered First or Last
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(a): Production to Uncertainty
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Figure 22: France: Migration EPU vs. Migration Fear, Large VAR
(a): Production to Uncertainty
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Figure 23: Germany: Migration EPU vs. Migration Fear, Large VAR
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(a): Production to Uncertainty
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Figure 24: United Kingdom: Migration EPU vs. Migration Fear, Large VAR
(a): Production to Uncertainty
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Figure 25: United States: Migration EPU vs. Migration Fear, Large VAR
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Figure 27: GDP Responses to Innovations in Different Indices
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Table 1: Forecast variance to uncertainty measures
(a) France
Industrial Production Unemployment
Horizon Migration EPU Migration Fear Migration EPU Migration Fear
h = 1 0.14 0.02 0.30 0.72
h = 4 5.74 0.27 0.17 3.22
h = 8 8.23 0.20 0.45 4.72
h = 40 16.83 6.91 2.46 8.96
(b) Germany
Industrial Production Unemployment
Horizon Migration EPU Migration Fear Migration EPU Migration Fear
h = 1 0.61 0.04 0.13 0.25
h = 4 1.06 1.06 0.24 4.74
h = 8 1.58 3.68 0.10 10.93
h = 40 2.47 30.61 3.28 41.86
(c) United Kingdom
Industrial Production Unemployment
Horizon Migration EPU Migration Fear Migration EPU Migration Fear
h = 1 0.69 0.38 2.10 0.35
h = 4 0.26 2.99 3.91 1.48
h = 8 1.28 2.14 5.28 2.92
h = 40 30.13 24.53 10.98 13.80
(d) United States
Industrial Production Unemployment
Horizon Migration EPU Migration Fear Migration EPU Migration Fear
h = 1 6.47 0.35 0.17 0.10
h = 4 3.95 0.43 1.09 3.58
h = 8 2.24 0.69 0.67 7.15
h = 40 6.56 0.74 2.01 13.41
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Table 2: Do economic variables forecast MEPU and MFI?
Shock type as dependent variable
Full sample Before GFC After GFC
MEPU MFI MEPU MFI MEPU MFI
Industrial production, last quarter -3.67* -1.23 -1.92 -1.42* 0.90 2.44
(1.51) (0.83) (1.39) (0.48) (3.55) (2.52)
Unemployment, last quarter -0.03* -0.04* -0.05* -0.01 -0.13* -0.08**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02)
F-test p-value 0.12 0.16 0.13 0.08 0.14 0.03
Observations 443 443 264 264 144 144
Notes: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%. All columns are estimated in OLS with robust
standard-errors clustered at the country level. All columns include a full set of year by quarter
dummies. The F-test p-value is the probability value of the F-test of the two economic variables in
each column.
Full sample: 1991:Q1-2018:Q3; Before GFC: 1991:Q1-2007:Q3; After GFC: 2009:Q3-2018:Q3.
Table 3: Correlations of migration indices with EPU and WUI
MEPU MFI
Dependent variable (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
EPU 0.219*** 0.221*** 0.307 0.319***
(18.05) (14.98) (1.40) (3.26)
WUI 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0004 0.0004***
(10.13) (6.38) (1.30) (4.75)
Country FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
N 348 348 364 364 348 348 364 364
R2 (within R2) 0.54 0.53 0.27 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.17 0.10
Notes: *,**,*** denote statically significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively. T-statistics in
columns (I), (III), (V) and (VII) are based on clustered standard errors. T-statistics in the remaining
columns are based on Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. R2 is reported for columns (I), (III), (V) and (VII);
otherwise within R2 is reported.
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Table 4: Forecast variance to uncertainty measures for EPU
France Germany
Horizon Migration EPU Migration Fear Migration EPU Migration Fear
h = 1 13.71 0.37 4.28 6.92
h = 4 26.53 7.11 8.16 13.31
h = 8 37.61 17.60 7.15 19.83
h = 40 61.49 44.34 7.06 44.73
UK US
Horizon Migration EPU Migration Fear Migration EPU Migration Fear
h = 1 13.23 8.00 6.00 0.10
h = 4 31.93 10.44 6.78 3.35
h = 8 47.33 33.07 9.09 3.37
h = 40 62.23 64.54 14.81 6.23
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Table 5: Correlations of alternate indices with stock market volatility and growth
MEPU MFI
Dependent variable (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
Stock market volatility 0.0002 0.001* 0.0004 0.001
(0.45) (1.72) (0.37) (0.60)
Growth -0.000001 -0.000003 -0.000004 0.0000004
(-0.48) (-0.78) (-0.42) (0.05)
Country FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
N 280 280 336 336 280 280 336 336
R2 (within R2) 0.38 0.02 0.02 0.002 0.38 0.00 0.02 0.00
EPU WUI
Dependent variable (IX) (X) (XI) (XII) (XIII) (XIV) (XV) (XVI)
Stock market volatility 0.002** 0.002*** 0.517** 0.661***
(3.67) (2.87) (3.88) (3.62)
Growth -0.00004 -0.00004** -0.026** -0.030***
(-2.32) (-2.30) (-3.93) (-2.69)
Country FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
N 276 276 336 336 280 280 336 336
R2 (within R2) 0.35 0.13 0.02 0.04 0.37 0.07 0.06 0.08
Notes: *,**,*** denote statically significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively. T-statistics in columns
(I), (III), (V), (VII), (IX), (XI), (XIII), and (XV) are based on clustered standard errors. T-statistics in the
remaining columns are based on Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. R2 is reported for columns (I), (III), (V),
(VII), (IX), (XI), (XIII), and (XV); otherwise within R2 is reported.
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Table 6: Pairwise Correlations
Panel (a): All variables are in levels
Germany France
MEPU MFI Inflows MEPU MFI Inflows
MEPU 1.0000 1.0000
MFI 0.7604*** 1.0000 0.9255*** 1.0000
Inflows 0.6678** 0.8193*** 1.0000 0.6744*** 0.7832*** 1.0000
United Kingdom United States
MEPU MFI Inflows MEPU MFI Inflows
MEPU 1.0000 1.0000
MFI 0.9155*** 1.0000 0.5224*** 1.0000
Inflows 0.4319** 0.6280*** 1.0000 0.1796 0.0561 1.0000
Panel (b): All variables are in natural logs
Germany France
MEPU MFI Inflows MEPU MFI Inflows
MEPU 1.0000 1.0000
MFI 0.4494** 1.0000 0.8834*** 1.0000
Inflows 0.6047*** 0.6802*** 1.0000 0.6649*** 0.7799*** 1.0000
United Kingdom United States
MEPU MFI Inflows MEPU MFI Inflows
MEPU 1.0000 1.0000
MFI 0.9533*** 1.0000 0.3223 1.0000
Inflows 0.7705*** 0.7265*** 1.0000 0.2876 0.0461 1.0000
Note: All calculations are based on annual data between 1990 and 2016.
(*) significant at 10 percent significance level.
(**) significant at 5 percent significance level.
(***) significant at 1 percent significance level.
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Table 7: Attitudes towards immigration (%)
Present Don’t know/
level Increased Decreased Refused to answer
France 40 6 44 10
Germany 49 14 34 2
United Kingdom 24 5 69 2
United States 33 23 40 4
Source: International Organization for Migration (2015, Table 4.2).
Note: Figures might not add up to 100% due to rounding.
Table 8: Attitudes towards immigration by perception of job competition (%)
Mostly take jobs Mostly take jobs
that citizens in this that citizens in this Don’t know/
country do not want country want Both Refused to answer
France 40 10 33 17
Germany 61 15 19 5
United Kingdom 66 18 10 6
United States 68 21 7 4
Source: International Organization for Migration (2015, Figure 2.5).
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Appendix A
Appendix A.1 Bivariate VARs for investment and consumption
(a): Investment to Uncertainty
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Figure A1: France: Migration EPU vs. Migration Fear
(a): Investment to Uncertainty
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(b): Consumption to Uncertainty
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Figure A2: Germany: Migration EPU vs. Migration Fear
a
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(a): Investment to Uncertainty
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(b): Consumption to Uncertainty
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Figure A3: United Kingdom: Migration EPU vs. Migration Fear
(a): Investment to Uncertainty
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Figure A4: United States: Migration EPU vs. Migration Fear
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